In this work, Mercedes Rubio argues that St. Thomas Aquinas’s In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3 is his final reading of Moses Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed on the topic of the knowledge of God. According to Rubio, this text reveals the influence of the Guide on Aquinas’s doctrine of the divine attributes, his understanding of the role of faith and his Five Ways.Rubio’s central thesis is most likely to be met with skepticism, since many scholars who (...) work on both Aquinas and Maimonides readily acknowledge Maimonides’ influence on the development of a number of Aquinas’s ideas, including the Five Ways. With respect to her central thesis, then, Rubio painstakingly reconstructs the history of the Quaestio, arguing that it was written around 1266, roughly fourteen years after the original Commentary was composed, and then inserted back in the Commentary on the Sentences. Rubio argues further that Aquinas wrote the Quaestio in order to respond to allegations against the writings of Peter of Tarantasia to the effect that. (shrink)

The so-called "problem of religious language" is a philosophical problem generated by some of the doctrines of classical theism. For example, if one conceives of God as infinite, then it would seem that words used to describe finite creatures might not adequately describe him. The ambiguity in meaning with respect to the divine names is the "problem of religious language" or the "problem of naming God." ;There are three possible solutions to the problem of naming God: the equivocal approach, the (...) analogical approach, and the univocal approach. The equivocal view argues that words used with respect to God have a different meaning than the same words used with respect to creatures. After outlining Maimonides' view of equivocity, I argue that his approach limits speech about God to divine actions and negations. Given the richness of the monotheistic traditions and their assumption that truths about God can be communicated about God beyond the divine actions, this position seems unlikely. ;The univocal view argues that words used with respect to God are used in the same sense as when they are applied to creatures. After outlining William Alston's view of univocity, I argue that Alston's approach is to be rejected because it cannot accommodate the differences between God and human beings with respect to perfection. Alston's commitment to the functional interpretation of mental concepts permits him to predicate terms of God and of human beings that he alleges to be "partially univocal." I argue that on the basis of functionalism, only complete univocity could exist between God and human beings and that Alston, himself, rejects complete univocity between God and human beings on the basis of divine perfection. ;The analogical view argues that words used with respect to God signify the same thing as words used with respect to creatures, but in a different mode. I argue that the analogical approach of Thomas Aquinas provides the best means of naming God within the context of classical theism and that it does not fall prey to those problems faced by the equivocal and the univocal views. (shrink)

In the introduction to Aquinas on Friendship, Daniel Schwartz admits that his treatment of Aquinas’s theory of friendship is not exhaustive. His central argument is that Aquinas reworks several elements of Aristotle’s view of friendship in accordance with his Christian commitment to the ideal of friendship with God and to the theological virtue of charity . Schwartz develops this argument through a detailed description of some of the elements of Aquinas’s theory, most notably the concept of concordia, along with responses (...) to the challenges posed by those elements, drawn from such luminaries as John Duns Scotus, Cicero, and St. Paul.According to Schwartz, Aquinas identifies three acts of friendship: concordia, benevolentia, and beneficentia. While he claims that these three acts represent the larger themes of the volume, its content and subject index suggest otherwise. Chapters two through four address the nature of concordia and the possible impediments to it, such as heresy, disparity of. (shrink)

'24 and Philosophy' is a book you just can't do without. It's all here, folks: the reason Presidents trust him; how Jack cuts through the lies and ambiguities; why he puts his life on the line for others; and how he knows which knee cap to blow out to get that all-important next lead. With the help of twenty "'24' crazed" philosophers, you'll figure out what makes this guy tick, and much much more. A witty, but philosophical exploration of the (...) popular television series '24', now in its sixth season Addresses pressing ethical issues relating to torture, terrorism and warfare Raises fascinating questions about knowledge, loyalty, and suspicion Explores in-depth the character and behaviour of Jack Bauer Written by philosophers who are all serious fans of the show. (shrink)

_24 and Philosophy_ is a book you just can't do without. It's all here, folks: the reason Presidents trust him; how Jack cuts through the lies and ambiguities; why he puts his life on the line for others; and how he knows which knee cap to blow out to get that all-important next lead. With the help of twenty "_24_ crazed" philosophers, you'll figure out what makes this guy tick, and much much more. A witty, but philosophical exploration of the (...) popular television series _24_, now in its sixth season Addresses pressing ethical issues relating to torture, terrorism and warfare Raises fascinating questions about knowledge, loyalty, and suspicion Explores in-depth the character and behaviour of Jack Bauer Written by philosophers who are all serious fans of the show. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas' treatment of Moses Maimonides' via negativa has been frequently called into question. In particular, some contemporary Maimonideans have argued that Aquinas grossly misunderstands Maimonides. Other scholars argue that Maimonides' defense of his own position provides insuperable challenges to alternative ways of naming God, despite the problems Aquinas raised with the via negativa. In this article, the author attends to Aquinas' two objections to Maimonides in Summa theologiae I.13.2 in order to see if these objections are valid and further, (...) to see if Aquinas mischaracterizes Maimonides in this passage, as some have alleged. Before addressing the question of whether or not Aquinas understood Maimonides, the author offers also a brief introduction to the historical debate over religious language in the Middle Ages. /// O tratamento da via negativa de Moisés Maimónides por S. Tomás de Aquino tem sido frequentemente posta em questão. De um modo particular, os seguidores contemporâneos de Maimónides têm argumentado que S. Tomás compreendeu mal o pensador Judeu. Outros especialistas argumentam que a defesa de Maimónides da sua própria posição fornece desafios insuperáveis às maneiras alternativas de nomear Deus apesar das dificuldades identificadas por S. Tomás com a via negativa. Neste artigo, a autora ocupa-se sobretudo de duas objecções de S. Tomás de Aquino a Maimónides na Summa theologiae Ia.13.2, a fim de verificar a validade destas objecções e também para ver se S. Tomás não terá compreendido mal Maimónides nesta passagem, tal como alguns têm alegado. Antes de tratar a questão de saber se sim ou não S. Tomás compreendeu correctamente a Maimónides, a autora oferece uma breve introdução ao debate histórico sobre a linguagem religiosa na Idade Média. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas argues that baptism is necessary for salvation. However, he entertains a scenario described by Ambrose of Milan, such that Emperor Valentinian II converted to Christianity and was intending to be baptized but died before the sacrament could be performed. Aquinas argues that the Emperor could have achieved salvation without being baptized with water because he desired baptism and that desire was the result of his faith in God. In this paper, I offer a short treatment of Aquinas’s view (...) of baptism, his handling of the Valentinian II case, and his arguments concerning the efficacy of the baptism of desire. I conclude with a brief discussion of Aquinas’s treatment of the case of Cornelius the centurion, which illustrates how Aquinas’s view of baptism of desire and implicit faith can apply to those individuals who have no access to or connection with the Church. (shrink)

In this work, Joshua Hochschild presents the semantic principles of Cajetan's understanding of analogy, arguing that they should be understood on their own terms and not as a commentary on Aquinas despite the inevitable comparisons between the two thinkers. In the first three chapters, Hochschild argues convincingly that Cajetan's discussion is aimed to answer specific questions that were occasioned by John Duns Scotus's arguments against analogy and not solely as an attempt to interpret Aquinas. Hochschild summarizes Scotus's arguments as objections (...) to the use of analogy in scientific reasoning, which his opponents thought must be used in order for metaphysics to remain a science . More specifically, Scotus argues that only a univocal treatment of being could preserve such reasoning.In chapter 4, Hochschild argues that Aquinas does not provide an answer to Scotus's challenge, although a Thomistic answer could be formulated based on his writings . Despite this charitable admission, however, Hochschild appears to gainsay any such solution by claiming the following: "The proposed rule that analogy involves a common res significata and diverse modi significandi does not help us explain why some analogical terms can be used in syllogisms without causing the fallacy of equivocation" . As an example, Hochschild cites the analogical use of. (shrink)

In this work, Mercedes Rubio argues that St. Thomas Aquinas’s In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3 is his final reading of Moses Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed on the topic of the knowledge of God. According to Rubio, this text reveals the influence of the Guide on Aquinas’s doctrine of the divine attributes, his understanding of the role of faith and his Five Ways.Rubio’s central thesis is most likely to be met with skepticism, since many scholars who (...) work on both Aquinas and Maimonides readily acknowledge Maimonides’ influence on the development of a number of Aquinas’s ideas, including the Five Ways. With respect to her central thesis, then, Rubio painstakingly reconstructs the history of the Quaestio, arguing that it was written around 1266, roughly fourteen years after the original Commentary was composed, and then inserted back in the Commentary on the Sentences. Rubio argues further that Aquinas wrote the Quaestio in order to respond to allegations against the writings of Peter of Tarantasia to the effect that. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aquinas on FriendshipJennifer Hart WeedDaniel Schwartz. Aquinas on Friendship. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. xviii + 189. Cloth, $55.00.In the introduction to Aquinas on Friendship, Daniel Schwartz admits that his treatment of Aquinas’s theory of friendship is not exhaustive. His central argument is that Aquinas reworks several elements of Aristotle’s view of friendship in accordance with his Christian commitment to the ideal of friendship with God (...) and to the theological virtue of charity (viii). Schwartz develops this argument through a detailed description of some of the elements of Aquinas’s theory, most notably the concept of concordia, along with responses to the challenges posed by those elements, drawn from such luminaries as John Duns Scotus, Cicero, and St. Paul.According to Schwartz, Aquinas identifies three acts of friendship: concordia, benevolentia, and beneficentia. While he claims that these three acts represent the larger themes of the volume, its content and subject index suggest otherwise. Chapters two through four address the nature of concordia and the possible impediments to it, such as heresy, disparity of circumstances, and pride. Missing, however, are similarly detailed treatments of benevolentia and beneficentia. Chapters five and six describe the importance of hope for friendship and the relationship between friendship and justice. More surprisingly, chapter seven considers the satisfaction account of justice (as in the doctrine of the Atonement) and how this might affect Aquinas’s understanding of the restoration of friendship.According to Schwartz, “Faith, hope, and charity, the three theological virtues, are conceived of by Aquinas as stages in a process reaching its fulfillment in friendship with God” (14). Despite this admission and its importance for Aquinas’s theory of friendship, the link between friendship and the theological virtues is not discussed at length. In fact, the theological virtue of faith is not given much attention at all, although Schwartz references sacramental satisfaction and Christ’s atonement. Given Schwartz’s central argument, one would expect him to focus more on the three theological virtues, rather than concordia, which emerges as the theme of the volume. Additionally, there is an abrupt shift from philosophical and political concerns to theology in subsequent chapters, which are structured around the concepts of hope, satisfaction, and charity.Schwartz also includes more than one puzzling theological claim. For example, in reference to the theological virtues, he writes, “Human beings, however, must make themselves worthy of these goods in the eyes of God. For Aquinas, the process leading to friendship with God begins with the pursuit of these spiritual goods” (14). Those familiar with Aquinas’s commitment to the doctrine of original sin and his repudiation of Pelagianism will wonder how such a characterization of Aquinas’s theology is possible. Again, Schwartz also claims, regarding the Atonement, that “merit and satisfaction is made by voluntary actions. Yet, individual participation in Christ’s Passion is not always voluntary—infant baptism being a case in point” (159). Perhaps it is theological quibbling to point out that Aquinas condemns the forced conversions of unbelievers, or that he believes infants whose parents willingly bring them forward for baptism are not baptized involuntarily (Summa theologiae III.68.9 ad. 1). But the book invites such quibbles.There is also no discussion of the difference between Aristotle and Aquinas on friendship, particularly on the possibility of friendship between humans and God. Certainly, Aquinas’s [End Page 136] willingness to accept this possibility is innovative. But Schwartz simply offers Aquinas’s account of how friendship between humans and God is possible and then defends Aquinas from various objections (45–46). A more detailed comparison between the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas is found on the topic of concordia.In summary, Schwartz’s aim is ambitious for a volume of less than two hundred pages, but there is much to enjoy in the book. There is an interesting discussion of Aquinas’s endorsement of Seneca rather than Aristotle on gratitude and ingratitude in his brief discussion of beneficentia (16–19), and Schwartz’s treatment of the tension among justice, friendship, and charity is also illuminating. Finally, Schwartz is to be commended for his extensive use of almost the entire corpus of... (shrink)